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At a time when social psychologists believed that they 
had every reason to be proud of their discipline came the 
shattering news that Diederik Stapel, a prominent 
researcher in social psychology, had committed scientific 
fraud on a major scale. Social psychologists had hardly 
recovered from this shock when two more colleagues 
were accused of fraud and resigned from their positions. 
These events were particularly damaging, because they 
coincided with the start of a discussion of trust in psycho-
logical data (see Special Section on Replicability in 
Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence? Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 2012). Even though this discus-
sion focused on methodological issues that were unre-
lated to fraud, this distinction was not always maintained 
by the popular press. According to the introduction to 
the special section, there is “currently a crisis of confi-
dence in psychological science reflecting an unprece-
dented level of doubt among practitioners about the 
reliability of research findings in the field” (Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012, p. 528). Nosek and colleagues 
started the “Reproducibility Project,” a large-scale, collab-
orative effort to estimate the reproducibility of psycho-
logical science, which involves replicating all studies 
published in three psychology journals in 2008 (http://
openscienceframework.org). In contrast to the prevalent 
sentiment, we will argue that the claim of a replicability 
crisis is greatly exaggerated and that the hope that such 
a crisis (if it ever existed) could be solved by increasing 
the number of exact replications is misplaced.
Is the Claim of a Replicability Crisis 
Exaggerated?
There seems to have been two sets of events that fueled 
the crisis perception. First, there have been claims that 
some psychological researchers engage in “questionable 
research practices” that result in “false positive” findings 
(e.g., Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; John, Loewenstein, 
& Prelec, 2012; LeBel et al., 2013; Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 
2009). Simmons et al. (2011) reported simulations that 
showed that a number of research practices (e.g., stopping 
data collection on the basis of interim data analysis; 
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dropping experimental conditions from published reports) 
can result in an erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis. 
To be sure, methodological discussions are important for 
any discipline, and both fraud and dubious research pro-
cedures are damaging to the image of any field and poten-
tially undermine confidence in the validity of social 
psychological research findings. Thus far, however, no 
solid data exist on the prevalence of such research prac-
tices in either social or any other area of psychology. 
In fact, the discipline still needs to reach an agreement 
about the conditions under which these practices are 
unacceptable.
Second, there have been a number of failures to repli-
cate high-profile experiments on social priming (Doyen, 
Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Pashler, Coburn, & 
Harris, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013). For example, Doyen 
et al. (2012) reported an exact replication of a study by 
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996; Experiment 2a, 2b) that 
failed to reproduce the original results. Bargh et al. had 
repeatedly found that students who had been primed 
with words that triggered the stereotype of elderly walked 
more slowly down a corridor than students primed with 
words unrelated to the elderly stereotype. The Doyen 
et al. (2012) failure was soon followed by a report by 
Shanks et al. (2013) of a series of nine studies that failed 
to replicate the findings of another iconic experiment, the 
“professor study” of Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg 
(1998). These authors had found that participants who 
were primed with a category of persons who are consid-
ered highly intelligent (e.g., professors) performed better 
on a task of trivial pursuit than did participants primed 
with a category of persons who are considered less intel-
ligent (e.g., hooligans). These replication failures were 
the more astounding because of earlier publications of 
successful replications of both of these findings (summa-
rized in the Appendix).
Do these failures to replicate amount to a crisis of rep-
licability, as Pashler and Harris (2012) claimed in their 
contribution to the special section of Perspectives on 
Psychological Science on replications? We would argue 
that such a conclusion is premature. Failures to replicate 
are puzzling, but in social psychology, as in most sci-
ences, empirical findings cannot always be replicated 
(this was one of the reasons for the development of 
meta-analytic methods). It is therefore surprising that the 
failures to replicate some social priming studies received 
such disproportionate attention. Furthermore, one must 
wonder whether the response by Kahneman, who in a 
widely circulated letter to “priming researchers” warned 
that there was a “train wreck looming” because of a 
“storm of doubt about the robustness of priming results,” 
was really justified given the state of the published litera-
ture where priming is an entirely undisputed method that 
is widely used to test hypotheses about associative 
memory (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). In this tra-
dition, its impact on behavior was studied in a minor 
subarea of research, whereas most social psychological 
priming studies investigated the impact of subliminal or 
supraliminal primes on judgment. A meta-analysis of 
studies that investigated how trait primes influence 
impression formation identified 47 articles based on 
6,833 participants and found overall effects to be statisti-
cally highly significant (DeCoster & Claypool, 2004).
Are Exact Replications the Answer?
The claim of a replicability crisis in psychology is based 
on a major misunderstanding. Particularly, the myopic 
focus on “exact” replications neglects basic epistemologi-
cal principles. Exact replications are replications of an 
experiment that operationalize both the independent and 
the dependent variable in exactly the same way as the 
original study. (In contrast, conceptual replications try to 
operationalize the underlying theoretical variables using 
different manipulations and/or different measures.)
In evaluating the usefulness of exact replications, one 
has to distinguish between applied and basic research. A 
scientist who wants to establish the efficiency of a spe-
cific treatment or intervention is well advised to repeat-
edly apply exactly the same procedure. This is particularly 
relevant for clinical trials where a lack of reliability may 
have fatal consequences. However, matters are different 
in basic research where empirical outcomes are mean-
ingful only with respect to the theory being tested. In the 
postbehaviorist era, psychological theories are based on 
internal mechanisms such that replications must be 
directed at the internal antecedents of such theories. 
Although reproducibility of scientific findings is one of 
science’s defining features, the ultimate issue is the extent 
to which a theory has undergone strict tests and has been 
supported by empirical findings. It would be a mistake to 
assume that estimates of the reproducibility of empirical 
findings are the same as estimates of the validity of a 
specific theory. A finding may be eminently reproducible 
and yet constitute a poor test of a theory.
The fact that good experimental research is typically 
conducted with the aim to test theories throws a different 
light on the discussion of replicability. We will therefore 
briefly discuss the notion of theory and what researchers 
do when they test hypotheses derived from a theory.
Theories consist of a set of abstract constructs and of 
hypotheses about the relationship between these con-
structs. In conducting experiments to test such a hypoth-
esis, we develop empirical operationalizations to translate 
these constructs into variables that can be manipulated or 
measured. Because most theoretical constructs are fairly 
abstract and can be operationalized in multiple ways, 
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researchers can never be sure whether they have chosen 
a realistic or even optimal operationalization of a given 
construct. Because researchers can never be certain that 
they properly operationalized the theoretical constructs 
they are assessing and that they were successful in con-
trolling for all third variables that might have been 
responsible for their findings, a theory can never be 
proven to be “true” (Popper, 1959). However, as we will 
discuss later, this same feature may also create problems 
for falsifying a theory.
This reservation is less relevant for studies that are con-
ducted with the aim of merely testing the efficacy of a 
specific treatment. For example, an exact replication of a 
study to demonstrate the efficacy of a drug or psychologi-
cal intervention is informative, because with drugs or 
interventions (i.e., treatments), the main issue is that they 
work and that they have no negative side effects. Although 
one might want to vary the subject population receiving 
the treatment to have a broader basis for one’s evaluation 
of its efficacy, it would make no sense to use a different 
drug or alter the intervention. After all, the question to be 
addressed is whether the original treatment was effective.
Exact replications are also important when studies 
produce findings that are unexpected and only loosely 
connected to a theoretical framework. Thus, the fact that 
priming individuals with the stereotype of the elderly 
resulted in a reduction of walking speed was a finding 
that was unexpected. Furthermore, even though it was 
consistent with existing theoretical knowledge, there was 
no consensus about the processes that mediate the 
impact of the prime on walking speed. It was therefore 
important that Bargh et al. (1996) published an exact rep-
lication of their experiment in the same paper. Similarly, 
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) conducted four 
studies in which they replicated the priming effects. 
Three of these studies contained conditions that were 
exact replications. In the fourth, they primed “intelligent” 
directly with the trait rather than indirectly with the word 
“professor.”
Because it is standard practice in publications of new 
effects, especially of effects that are surprising, to publish 
one or two exact replications, it is clearly more condu-
cive to the advancement of psychological knowledge to 
conduct conceptual replications rather than attempting 
further duplications of the original study, unless plausible 
conceptual replications have failed. Given that both 
research time and money are scarce resources, the large-
scale attempts at duplicating previous studies seem to us 
misguided (http://openscienceframework.org).
The main criticism of conceptual replications is that 
they are less informative than exact replications (e.g., 
Pashler & Harris, 2012). This raises two questions, namely 
(a) what information do we gain from a successful repli-
cation of the original finding after faithfully repeating the 
original experiment, and (b) what do we learn when we 
have failed to replicate the original finding? Let us address 
each of these issues in the following sections.
A comparison of direct and  
conceptual replications
The illusion of exact replication. If one accepts that 
the true purpose of replications is a (repeated) test of a 
theoretical hypothesis rather than an assessment of the 
reliability of a particular experimental procedure, a major 
problem of exact replications becomes apparent: Repeat-
ing a specific operationalization of a theoretical construct 
at a different point in time and/or with a different popu-
lation of participants might not reflect the same theoreti-
cal construct that the same procedure operationalized in 
the original study. This is less of a problem in studies 
where both the independent and the dependent vari-
ables are not culturally or socially mediated, for example, 
when the size or the brightness of stimuli is assessed by 
participants (who work in isolation) or when weight per-
ception is related to the size of an object. Obviously, in 
such studies, one does not have to worry whether these 
variables have been properly realized, and exact replica-
tions should yield the findings of previous studies. How-
ever, in social psychological studies, the faithful 
replication of an operationalization of a theoretical con-
struct at a different point in time and with a different 
subject population may be dissociated from the theoreti-
cal construct of the original study.
Let us illustrate this point with some classic social psy-
chological experiments. In their study of the effect of the 
severity of initiation to a group on liking for that group, 
Aronson and Mills (1959) operationalized the severe ini-
tiation by having female participants read aloud “12 
obscene words, e.g., fuck, cock, and screw” as well “two 
vivid descriptions of sexual activity from contemporary 
novels” (p. 178). If repeated with today’s female students, 
this manipulation might trigger amusement rather than 
embarrassment. Similarly, it is likely that a researcher 
who tried to induce fear about toothbrushing in high 
school students by telling them that improper care of 
their teeth might result in “cancer, paralysis or other sec-
ondary diseases” ( Janis & Feshbach, 1953) might arouse 
disbelief rather than fear.
Why outcomes of exact replications are often unin-
formative. Let us now return to the failed replications 
of behavior priming studies described earlier. To discuss 
these failures, readers need to be reminded of the theo-
retical rationale behind these studies. According to cur-
rent theorizing (e.g., Loersch & Payne, 2011; Schröder & 
Thagard, 2013; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the priming acti-
vates concepts that spread activation to other concepts 
that are episodically or semantically linked (e.g., “elderly” 
→ “walking slowly”; “professors” → “intelligent”). Then, 
 at University Library Utrecht on March 3, 2014pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
62 Stroebe and Strack
priming may affect behavior in a controlled fashion if a 
behavioral decision is based on concepts whose activa-
tion potential has been increased. Alternatively, these 
concepts may be directly linked with behavioral sche-
mata. Of course, such subtle influences depend on other 
conditions, such as factors that facilitate or constrain the 
execution of such behaviors and the awareness of the 
priming episode, which may cause an active correction 
(see Strack & Hannover, 1996; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, 
Kübler, & Wänke, 1993). Thus, subtly priming or even 
subliminal priming procedures may be more effective 
than blatantly directing people’s attention toward some 
content.
The theoretical variable “activation of concept X” is 
manipulated by exposing the person to some element of 
“X” or an element that is closely associated. Although the 
experimenter has control over the prime, this is not true 
for the concept it activates. People differ in their beliefs 
about the elderly. Furthermore, different beliefs are dif-
ferently accessible in different contexts (e.g., an old ath-
lete vs. an old professor). Therefore, the same prime can 
activate different concepts in different people and/or 
under different conditions.
It is crucial for replicating behavior priming studies 
that the prime is successful in increasing the accessibility 
of the cognitive representation that is assumed to induce 
the behavior. In priming the stereotype of the elderly, the 
theoretically targeted cognitive representation is that of 
“walking slowly.” It is therefore possible that the priming 
procedure used in the Doyen et al. (2012) study failed in 
this respect, even though Doyen et al. faithfully repli-
cated the priming procedure of Bargh et al. (1996). First, 
the French translation of the words Bargh et al. used in 
their scrambled sentence test might have been associated 
with different meanings in Belgium. Second, it is also 
possible that the concept of “walking slowly” is not a 
central part of the stereotype of elderly in Belgium some 
20 years later. With life expectancies increasing nearly 
every year and people staying active to a much higher 
age (Stroebe, 2011), this construct might no longer form 
part of the elderly stereotype even in New York. Although 
Doyen et al. (2012) tested whether they succeeded in 
priming the stereotype of elderly people, they failed to 
assess whether this prime increased the accessibility of 
the cognitive representation of “walking slowly.”1
This criticism also applies to the failed replications of 
the Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) “professor 
studies” reported by Shanks et al. (2013). Although it 
seems likely that professors are considered more intelli-
gent than soccer hooligans by the students who served as 
subjects in Shank’s research, it is still possible that even if 
the participants considered professors as more intelligent 
than hooligans, the priming manipulation might have 
failed to increase the cognitive representation of the con-
cept “intelligence.” It is even possible that the fact that 
these findings are reported in most social psychology text-
books and are therefore widely known among student 
participants could have affected the results. Another likely 
reason for their failure could be their selection of knowl-
edge items. If the effect of professor priming is motiva-
tional, then the knowledge items have to be selected in a 
way as to best reflect motivation effects. This is unlikely to 
be the case for questions that are so difficult that students 
are unlikely to know the answer or so easy that practically 
everybody can answer them easily.
To be sure, these possibilities are speculative, but they 
illustrate that nonreplications are uninformative unless 
one can demonstrate that the theoretically relevant con-
ditions were met. Faithfully replicating the original condi-
tions of an experiment does not guarantee that one 
addresses the same theoretical construct as in the original 
study. In order to check if a given operationalization is 
successful in manipulating the intended theoretical con-
struct, manipulation checks are necessary that are inde-
pendent of the dependent variable. Therefore, instead of 
conducting nine “exact” replications, Shanks et al. (2013) 
would have been well advised to conduct at least some 
empirical tests of whether their manipulation succeeded 
in increasing the cognitive accessibility of the theoreti-
cally relevant concept (e.g., using a lexical decision task). 
Such an approach would have provided the information 
that exact replications are lacking.
The effective use of replications. Because experi-
ments are typically conducted with the aim of testing a 
theoretical hypothesis, the important question is not 
whether the original finding can be duplicated but 
whether it constituted a rigorous test of the postulated 
mechanism. To take frustration–aggression theory as an 
example, any experimental test of that theory is based on 
the assumption that the experimental manipulation is a 
valid operationalization of the theoretical construct “frus-
tration” and that the measure of aggression is a valid 
operationalization of the theoretical construct “aggres-
sion.” If we replicate the findings of an earlier frustration–
aggression experiment by exactly repeating the procedure 
of that experiment, we have demonstrated that the study 
is reproducible, but we have only marginally increased 
our trust in the validity of the underlying theory. Con-
versely, if a conceptual replication using a different oper-
ationalization of both constructs had succeeded in 
supporting the theoretical hypothesis, our trust in the 
validity of the underlying theory would have been 
strengthened. “With every difference that is introduced 
the confirmatory power of the replication increases,” 
because we have shown that the phenomenon does not 
hinge on a particular operationalization but “generalizes 
to a larger area of application” (Schmidt, 2009, p. 93).
An even more effective strategy to increase our trust 
in a theory is to test it using completely different 
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manipulations. Let us illustrate this with an example from 
the social psychology of persuasion. According to dual 
process theories of persuasion (i.e., the elaboration likeli-
hood model of Petty and Cacioppo [1986] or the heuristic-
systematic model of Chaiken [1980]), the impact of the 
quality of the arguments contained in a communication is 
greater the more thoughtfully and deeply the communica-
tion is processed by a recipient. This prediction has been 
supported with very different manipulations of the pro-
cessing depth, such as distraction (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 
1976), personal relevance (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 
1981), expectation to have to discuss the communication 
at a future meeting (Chaiken, 1980), and need for closure 
(Klein & Webster, 2000). These models further predict that 
when recipients are unable or unmotivated to process a 
communication, they will rely more on heuristic cues than 
on argument quality. This prediction was supported by 
Petty et al. (1981) using communicator credibility as heu-
ristic cue and by Chaiken (1980) as well as by Klein and 
Webster (2000) using the number of arguments. Thus, 
even though the various experiments were very different 
and used different experimental manipulations, different 
attitude issues, and different dependent measures, they all 
tested the same underlying theory. If this theory had been 
less valid, further empirical studies guided by them would 
have been likely to fail, even if original studies had yielded 
(false) positive results.
Thus, one reason why exact replications are not very 
interesting is that they contribute little to scientific knowl-
edge. If an exact replication reinstates the finding of the 
original study, we have learned that the original outcome 
was reproducible. We are not any wiser as to whether the 
original study was a good test of the theory to be tested 
because even though the experiment may have been 
poorly designed, a faithful replication might result in the 
same finding. Conversely, if we succeed in supporting 
the theoretical hypothesis with an experiment that opera-
tionalized both the independent and the dependent vari-
able differently and thus sampled different parts of the 
same theoretical concept, we have gained additional 
information and increased our trust in the underlying 
theory.
Why null findings are not always that 
informative
Related to the drive for an increase in exact replications 
is the argument that we should publish more null find-
ings. This idea has a long history. Already in 1975, 
Greenwald published an article on the “Consequences of 
prejudice against the null hypothesis” in which he con-
cluded “that research traditions and customs of discrimi-
nation against accepting the null hypothesis may be very 
detrimental to research progress” (p. 1). Recognizing this 
problem, a group of social psychology graduate students 
at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1970 
had started the journal Representative Research in Social 
Psychology, which gives special consideration to null 
findings and replications (Chamberlin, 2000). Since 2002, 
there has also been the free-access Journal of Articles in 
Support of the Null Hypothesis. Another free-access jour-
nal, PLoS One, also publishes articles reporting null 
results. Most recently, Pashler and colleagues created the 
Web site www.psychfiledrawer.org, where short reports 
of null findings can be posted. Thus, there is no shortage 
of outlets for the publication of negative findings.
The problem is that these journals lack the prestige of 
some of the high-impact journals in social psychology 
that have typically rejected articles reporting null find-
ings. Therefore, strategies have been suggested to encour-
age exact replications of published research findings 
through changes in the incentive system of our discipline 
(e.g., Koole & Lakens, 2012). For example, the editor of 
the Journal of Research in Personality now encourages 
and publishes high-quality replications in the hope that 
“JRP will be able to provide critical information about 
which initial discoveries really hold up over time” (http://
www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-research-in- 
personality/news/professor-richard-lucas-encouraging-
replication-studies). Furthermore, the Open Science 
Collaboration—a group of more than 175 volunteer 
researchers—initiated the Reproducibility Project to rep-
licate a sample of studies published in 2008 in three 
major psychology journals. The aim is to obtain an “esti-
mate of the reproducibility of current psychological sci-
ence” (Open Science Collaboration, 2012, p. 658). As one 
scientist whose supportive comment is cited in that docu-
ment argued,
If [our] discoveries are true, other people in other 
places should be able to rely on them, and build on 
them, to push further, and build a cumulative body 
of knowledge. These values are central to what it is, 
for me, to be a scientist, and the Reproducibility 
Project expresses those values. . . . The project 
exclusively attempts direct replications “repetition 
of an experimental procedure” in order to “verify a 
piece of knowledge.” (Schmidt, 2009, pp. 92–93)
The illusion of theoretical verification. Statements 
such as this raise the question about what precisely is 
meant by the “discovery” that needs to be “verified.” Is 
the discovery of the Aronson and Mills (1959) study their 
empirical finding that girls who had to read aloud four-
letter words evaluated a group discussion of the sex life 
of lower animals more positively than girls who had to 
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read words that were related to sex but not obscene (e.g., 
prostitute, virgin, and petting), or is it the support of 
the hypothesis derived from dissonance theory that 
members who had gone through a severe initiation 
should overestimate the attractiveness of their group to 
reduce dissonance?
If it is the empirical finding, then other people in other 
places should better not rely on the results, unless the 
other people are other Americans. It is doubtful that the 
manipulation would have worked outside the United 
States or Northern Europe even in 1959 (Arnett, 2008; see 
also Stroebe & Nijstad, 2009).2 Furthermore, as we argued 
earlier, even Americans would be unlikely to reproduce 
these findings with this particular experimental manipu-
lation today. If the discovery that needs to be “verified” is 
the theoretical hypothesis, then other people in other 
places should not rely on it too much either, because the 
bad news is that theories cannot be verified or even dem-
onstrated as probable (Popper, 1959). And with regard to 
the effect of the severity of initiation on the attractiveness 
of a group, some revision of the original hypothesis 
seems certainly necessary (e.g., Lodewijkx & Syroit, 1997; 
Lodewijkx, van Zomeren, & Syroit, 2005).
What can we learn from null findings? If knowl-
edge about null findings is so important, why does our 
discipline seem to be so uninterested? One reason is that 
not all null findings are interesting. For example, just 
before his downfall, Stapel published an article on how 
disordered contexts promote stereotyping and discrimi-
nation. In this publication, Stapel and Lindenberg (2011) 
reported findings showing that litter or a broken-up side-
walk and an abandoned bicycle can increase social dis-
crimination. These findings, which were later retracted, 
were judged to be sufficiently important and interesting 
to be published in the highly prestigious journal Science. 
Let us assume that Stapel had actually conducted the 
research described in this paper and failed to support his 
hypothesis. Such a null finding would have hardly mer-
ited publication in the Journal of Articles in Support of the 
Null Hypothesis. It would have been uninteresting for the 
same reason that made the positive result interesting, 
namely, that (a) nobody expected a relationship between 
disordered environments and prejudice and (b) there 
was no previous empirical evidence for such a relation-
ship. Similarly, if Bargh et al. (1996) had found that prim-
ing participants with the stereotype of the elderly did 
not influence walking speed or if Dijksterhuis and 
van Knippenberg (1998) had reported that priming par-
ticipants with “professor” did not improve their perfor-
mance on a task of trivial pursuit, nobody would have 
been interested in their findings. Thus, null findings are 
interesting only if they contradict a central hypothesis 
derived from an established theory and/or are discrepant 
with a series of earlier studies.
If we accept that the ultimate aim of research is to test 
theories and if we further accept the epistemological 
position of critical rationalism (Popper, 1959) that theo-
ries can only be falsified but never be proven true, then 
such negative findings should be influential, because 
they help us to falsify theories. However, our earlier dis-
cussion of the conflict surrounding the professor-priming 
studies also signals a major problem with Popper’s posi-
tion, namely, that it is difficult to decide when a theory 
should be considered falsified. The theory underlying the 
professor studies is that priming people with the concept 
of professor will increase in their minds the cognitive 
accessibility of “clever” or “intelligent.” According to some 
not yet specified process, the increase in the cognitive 
accessibility of the cognitive representations of these 
concepts will improve their performance on a knowl-
edge test.
The nonreplications published by Shanks and col-
leagues (2013) cannot be taken as a falsification of that 
theory, because their study does not explain why previ-
ous research was successful in replicating the original 
findings of Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998). 
Thus, although the Shanks et al. (2013) study signals a 
potential problem with the stability of the professor-
priming effect, it offers no explanation for the discrep-
ancy between their findings and that of earlier studies. 
Even multiple failures to replicate an established finding 
would not result in a rejection of the original hypothesis, 
if there are also multiple studies that supported that 
hypothesis. Because failures of exact replications do not 
tell us why findings cannot be replicated, they are ulti-
mately not very informative. The believers will keep on 
believing, pointing at the successful replications and der-
ogating the unsuccessful ones, whereas the nonbelievers 
will maintain their belief system drawing on the failed 
replications for support of their rejection of the original 
hypothesis. Thus, one reason why null findings are not 
very interesting is because they tell us only that a finding 
could not be replicated but not why this was the case. 
This conflict can be resolved only if researchers develop 
a theory that could explain the inconsistency in findings. 
Such a theory should allow one to identify the factor that 
determined whether the priming effect occurs. Thus, 
instead of testing a theory against the null hypothesis, a 
more successful strategy is to test it against an alternative 
hypothesis.
Nonreplications as interaction effects. In the ongo-
ing discussion, “failures to replicate” are typically taken 
as a threat to the existence of the phenomenon. Method-
ologically, however, nonreplications must be understood 
as interaction effects in that they suggest that the effect 
of the crucial influence depends on the idiosyncratic 
conditions under which the original experiment was 
conducted. Of course, interaction effects are highly 
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informative if the additional variables are psychologically 
meaningful. However, the conditions of “exact replica-
tions” are psychologically unspecified and include an 
infinite number of influences that may come from the 
cultural circumstances, the experimental setting, charac-
teristics of the participants, and so forth. The resulting 
ambiguity prevents anything to be learned from such an 
interaction. As a consequence, the mere coexistence of 
exact replications that are both successful and unsuccess-
ful is likely to leave researchers helpless about what to 
conclude from such a pattern of outcomes. Conducting 
exact replications in a registered and coordinated fashion 
by different laboratories does not remove the described 
shortcomings. This is also the case if exact replications 
are proposed as a means to estimate the “true size” of an 
effect. As the size of an experimental effect always 
depends on the specific error variance that is generated 
by the context, exact replications can assess only the effi-
ciency of an intervention in a given situation but not the 
generalized strength of a causal influence.
Instead of leaving the circumstances unspecified, the 
interaction can be informative if the conditions of replica-
tion attempts are psychologically defined. This can be 
illustrated with the classic example of dissonance aroused 
by counterattitudinal advocacy. Festinger and Carlsmith 
(1959) argued that a person will experience dissonance if 
the person believes “X” but has, as a result of pressure 
brought on the individual, publicly stated that he or she 
believes “not X.” They further proposed that the magni-
tude of the dissonance would be maximal if the prom-
ised rewards or threatened punishments were just barely 
enough to induce the person to say “not X.” Although 
their theoretical analysis was valid, it took a decade 
before researchers were able to reliably replicate the 
findings reported by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). 
Replication became possible only once they realized that 
for counterattitudinal behavior to arouse dissonance, the 
actor had to be made to feel responsible for telling a lie 
(i.e., freedom of choice; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) 
and that that lie had negative consequences for the other 
person (Cooper & Worchel, 1970). This strategy was in 
line with the argument of Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, 
and Baumgardner (1986), that to reduce a needlessly 
overgeneralized theory, one needs to identify the condi-
tions under which this theory applies.
Resolving conflicts between competing theories. 
The search for moderator variables that determine the 
conditions under which theories apply is also the most 
effective strategy for resolving conflicts between compet-
ing theories that offer explanations for the same psycho-
logical phenomena. After discussing the various empirical 
strategies that researchers used to distinguish between 
impression management and intrapsychic explanations 
for a variety of research findings, Tetlock and Manstead 
(1985) concluded that neither side emerged as clear win-
ner. They suggested that a more profitable strategy was 
“to abandon the search for crucial experiments and to 
focus on clarifying the points of similarity and dissimilar-
ity between rival intrapsychic and impression manage-
ment theories” (p. 71). Both theories should be considered 
as special cases of an integrative theoretical framework. 
Similarly, dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and self-
perception theory (Bem, 1965) were established as com-
peting theories. And yet decades of research attempting 
to demonstrate the superiority of one over the other 
resulted in conflicting findings. To resolve this conflict, 
it was suggested that both theories were valid but applied 
only under certain conditions (e.g., Fazio, Zanna, & 
Cooper, 1977; Stroebe & Diehl, 1988).
If we look at the history of social psychology, theories 
have rarely been abandoned because of failed replica-
tions. Theories are often abandoned because researchers 
simply lose interest (Greenwald, 2012). The reason for 
this loss has often been that they no longer matched the 
prevailing theoretical paradigm (Kuhn, 1996; for exam-
ple, the rise of social cognition research resulted in a loss 
of interest in the motivations explanations offered by 
consistency theories). As Hilton (2012) observed, “social 
psychology does seem to have a disquieting tendency to 
forget theories rather than disprove them” (p. 69). But 
more frequently, competing theories are not abandoned 
but reduced in their generality. That is, what originally 
seemed to be a simple main effect turned out to be a 
more complex interaction.
Replications as fraud detectors
This leads us to a last argument in justification of exact 
replications, namely, that they facilitated the detection of 
fraudulent research. For example, Crocker and Cooper 
(2011, p. 1182) argued: “Despite the need for reproducible 
results to drive progress, studies that replicate or fail to 
replicate others’ findings are almost impossible to publish 
in top scientific journals. This disincentive means fraud can 
go undetected, which was the case with Stapel.” Similarly, 
Roediger (2012, p. 27) stated “that if others had tried to 
replicate his [Stapel’s] work soon after its publication, his 
misdeeds might have been uncovered much more quickly.” 
Along the same lines, Chambers and Sumner (2012) wrote:
Replication is our best friend because it keeps us 
honest. In science, false results have a short (albeit 
potentially damaging) lifespan because regardless 
of how they come about, other scientists won’t be 
able to reproduce them. On the other hand, true 
results will be replicated time and time again by 
different scientists. (para. 10) 
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Finally, Mummendey (2012, p. 7) went even further 
and suggested:
Scientific journals could expand their already high 
standards of the peer review system by adding the 
requirement for a thorough external replication. 
Authors submit their manuscript together with their 
data. Once the publication has been approved by  
a preliminary group of reviewers, the editors  
invite suitable experts to attempt a replication of 
the results. After this has been accomplished, both  
the original manuscript and the replication study 
are published together.
Replications are poor fraud detectors. Existing evi-
dence, however, sheds doubt on the success of such strat-
egies. In a recent article, Stroebe, Postmes, and Spears 
(2012) analyzed 40 fraud cases to identify the way by 
which the fraud had been detected. Because this is rarely 
reported in official reports, they had to rely on fraud cases 
that were sufficiently significant to be discussed in local or 
national papers, because unlike agencies such as the U.S. 
Office of Research Integrity, journalists typically like to 
know how fraudsters were discovered. To their own sur-
prise, Stroebe and colleagues found that replications 
hardly played any role in the discovery of these fraud 
cases. As was the case with Stapel (Levelt, Noort, & Drenth, 
2012), most fraud cases are detected by close colleagues 
or research or graduate student assistants of the fraudster, 
who act as whistleblowers (Stroebe et al., 2012). Fraud-
sters are also frequently identified by outside colleagues, 
who work in the same field and find inconsistencies in 
journal articles that are often editorial in nature (e.g., 
the same figure for different outcomes). For example, the 
fraud of the Norwegian cancer researcher John Sudbo, like 
Stapel a young star player in his field, was discovered by 
the head of the epidemiology division at the Norwegian 
Institute of Public Health, who realized that the cancer 
patient database used in the study had not yet been avail-
able at the time of the study (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Jon_Sudb%C3%B8).
In social psychology, as in many areas of medicine 
and even physics, replication failures are due to incom-
plete description of the methodology that was used in a 
study or because important moderators were not spelled 
out by a theory. Given that fraud (as far as we know) is 
extremely rare, it is not surprising that failed replications 
are not diagnostic about fraud.
Meta-analyses are poor fraud detectors. That this 
limitation even applies to meta-analyses can be illustrated 
with the findings of a meta-analysis of priming studies by 
DeCoster and Claypool (2004). They reported that the 
sizes of priming effects were larger in studies conducted 
in countries outside the United States and Canada. The 
authors wrote:
We had no a priori expectation that nationality 
would moderate priming effects; moreover, there is 
little reason to believe that the underlying 
psychological principles responsible for assimilation, 
anchoring, or correction effects would differ cross-
culturally. We therefore suspect that these effects 
simply reflect idiosyncratic differences between 
U.S./Canadian labs and those elsewhere. (p. 10)
With hindsight, one striking difference is that Stapel 
was first author on 7 of the 10 assimilation studies, on 6 
of the 7 anchoring contrast studies, and on 2 of the 3 cor-
rection contrast studies that were responsible for this 
nationality effect. Should one have suspected fraud? 
Probably not. It is quite possible that European (student) 
participants take experiments more seriously or differ in 
other ways from American undergraduates, who serve as 
subjects in most social psychological research.
The findings of the meta-analysis of DeCoster and 
Claypool (2004) indicate another problem with replica-
tions as indicator of fraud, namely, that except for their 
effect sizes, the findings of the priming research reported 
by Stapel and colleagues were quite consistent with 
multiple studies conducted in the United States. It is 
typical for successful fraudsters that they avoid produc-
ing unexpected findings and that their results are in line 
with the expectations of the field. Some of the Stapel 
articles that had been included in this meta-analysis 
were identified as fraudulent in the final report of 
the three committees that had been appointed to inves-
tigate the Stapel affair (Levelt et al., 2012). And yet 
even though Stapel may have been somewhat overen-
thusiastic in improving the data, his findings have been 
replicated by other authors. As Stapel wrote in his auto-
biography, he was always pleased when his invented 
findings were replicated: “What seemed logical and was 
fantasized became true” (Stapel, 2012). Thus, neither 
can failures to replicate a research finding be used as 
indicators of fraud, nor can successful replications be 
invoked as indication that the original study was hon-
estly conducted.
Conclusion
Psychologists have no reason for complacency. The fact 
that one of our colleagues committed one of the greatest 
research frauds in recent history should be a wake-up 
call. Therefore, even though we are (or at least should 
be) aware of the methodological standards of good 
research, it is helpful to be reminded that certain proce-
dures can substantially distort the results of the statistical 
tests (Simmons et al., 2011).
As a field, we have reacted (or are at least planning to 
react) to these challenges by instituting measures that 
will increase the risk of discovery for people who still 
engage in these practices. Thus, if the rule will be 
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instituted that for all published studies the materials used 
as well as the data are stored at a publicly accessible Web 
site, many questionable practices will become publicly 
visible. Although this regulation cannot prevent people 
from submitting only a selection of their measures and 
from “cleaning up” their data before submission, it should 
act as a deterrent. And it will certainly allow interested 
parties to reanalyze data to see whether the original con-
clusions are indeed supported. Unfortunately, there has 
been a great deal of resistance from major journal pub-
lishers (e.g., the American Psychological Association, the 
Association for Psychological Science) against instituting 
such a rule, but most Dutch and a few U.S. universities 
have now done so at the university level.
Another promising improvement is the Web site for 
reporting successful and unsuccessful replications (www 
.psychfiledrawer.org). But whereas it will certainly be 
useful to be informed about studies that are difficult to 
replicate, we are less confident about whether the invest-
ment of time and effort of the volunteers of the Open 
Science Collaboration is well spent on replicating studies 
published in three psychology journals. The result will be 
a reproducibility coefficient that will not be greatly infor-
mative, because of justified doubts about whether the 
“exact” replications succeeded in replicating the theoreti-
cal conditions realized in the original research.
As social psychologists, we are particularly concerned 
that one of the outcomes of this effort will be that results 
from our field will be perceived to be less “reproducible” 
than research in other areas of psychology. This is to be 
expected because for the reasons discussed earlier, 
attempts at “direct” replications of social psychological 
studies are less likely than exact replications of experi-
ments in psychophysics to replicate the theoretical condi-
tions that were established in the original study.
Although psychologists should not be complacent, 
there seem to be no reasons to panic the field into 
another crisis. Crises in psychology are not caused by 
methodological flaws but by the way people talk about 
them (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2012). Although the discus-
sion of research practices in social psychology is healthy 
and may ultimately lead to an improvement of the rules 
that guide us on the way we analyze, report, and store 
our data, magnifying the present problems into a “repli-
cability crisis” is likely to be counterproductive in the 
long run.
Appendix: Failures to Replicate Social 
Priming Studies
Bargh and Colleagues’ priming 
walking speed
Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996, Experiment 2a, 2b) 
primed their participants with a scrambled-sentence test 
that contained either words that evoked the elderly ste-
reotype or words that were unrelated. After the experi-
ment had apparently been finished, a second experimenter 
measured how fast participants were walking down a 
corridor. Participants primed with the elderly stereotype 
walked significantly slower than those primed with unre-
lated traits. Moreover, a replication of that study by the 
same authors using different participants resulted in 
nearly identical results.
Several successful conceptual replications have been 
published (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002; Cesario, Plaks, & 
Higgins, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Spears, & Lepinasse, 2001; 
Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002; Ku, Wang, & 
Galinsky, 2010; Macrae et al., 1998). For example, the 
participants of the study of Ku et al. (2010, Study 3) 
were shown a photograph of an older individual and 
were subsequently asked to write a narrative about a day 
in the life of that person. Half the participants were 
instructed to take the perspective of that person in their 
story writing, while the other half were told to write as 
objectively as possible. In line with the original predic-
tions, participants afterward walked more slowly if they 
had been given the instructions to take the elderly per-
spective than to be objective. Dijksterhuis et al. (2001) 
and Kawakami et al. (2002) showed that elderly primes 
slowed down reactions to a lexical decision task. Macrae 
et al. (1998) found that participants read a word list faster 
when primed with “Michael Schumacher” (at that time 
Formula One world champion) than with a neutral prime. 
Finally, Mussweiler (2006) demonstrated the reverse 
effect, namely, that moving more slowly led participants 
to ascribe more elderly-stereotypic characteristics to a 
target (Experiment 2).
Cesario et al. (2006, Experiment 2) conducted another 
conceptual replication that differed from the original 
study only in the method of priming (i.e., subliminal pre-
sentation of pictures of elderly [and young people] rather 
than words in scrambled sentences). Cesario and col-
leagues were only partially successful in replicating the 
findings of Bargh et al. (1996). Participants were found to 
walk more slowly and took more time to walk to the exit 
after having been subliminally primed with pictures of 
older people than participants primed with pictures of 
young people, but walking speed in both conditions did 
not differ significantly from an unprimed control group. 
Thus, although the study demonstrated that priming with 
social categories can influence walking speed, it did not 
replicate the finding of Bargh et al. (1996) that priming 
with the elderly stereotype reduces walking speed in 
comparison to an unprimed control group. This differ-
ence could have been due to the different type of prim-
ing used.
The only exact replication of the study was conducted 
by Doyen et al. (2012), who repeated the original 
study, with the only difference that walking speed was 
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measured objectively by infrared sensor rather than with a 
stopwatch. They did not find any difference between the 
two priming conditions in their first experiment. In their 
second experiment, they did observe an effect but only if 
experimenters were explicitly instructed to expect the 
primed participants to walk more slowly. This raised the 
possibility that the original findings had been caused by 
the experimenters’ expectations and that the second 
experimenter measuring walking speed with a stopwatch 
was somehow aware of the experimental condition. 
However, in their method section, Bargh et al. (1996) 
clearly stated that experimenters and observers were blind 
to experimental conditions. Furthermore, experimenter 
expectation affected walking speed even when it was 
measured objectively in the Doyen et al. (2012) study. 
Thus, it remains unclear how experimenter expectations 
could have influenced the participants’ speed of walking.
The “professor studies” of Dijksterhuis 
and van Knippenberg
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) primed partici-
pants either with a category of persons who are usually 
considered highly intelligent (e.g., professor) or with a 
category of persons who are considered less intelligent 
(e.g., hooligan). The priming manipulation consisted of 
participants having to think of a typical professor (or 
hooligan) and then list lifestyle, behavior, and appear-
ance attributes of the typical member of the primed cat-
egory. In an apparently unrelated second experiment, 
participants had to answer a number of general knowl-
edge questions taken from trivial pursuit. Dijksterhuis 
and van Knippenberg found that thinking about a cate-
gory of intelligent persons resulted in better performance 
of the trivial pursuit task than thinking of a category of 
less intelligent persons and conducted four replications 
of the finding. Conceptual replications have been 
reported by several different laboratories from different 
countries, with most articles containing multiple studies 
(e.g., Bry, Follenfant, & Meyer, 2008; Galinsky, Wang, & 
Ku, 2008; Haddock, Macrae, & Fleck, 2002; Hansen & 
Wänke, 2009; LeBoeuf & Estes, 2004; Lowery, Eisenberger, 
Hardin, & Sinclair, 2007; Nussinson, Seibt, Häfner, & 
Strack, 2010). However, recently Shanks and colleagues 
(2013) conducted nine exact replication studies. In none 
of the studies did the manipulation yield a statistically 
significant effect on performance.
The findings reported by Shanks et al. (2013) are not 
only inconsistent with the successful replications of the 
professor studies, they are also inconsistent with other 
findings showing that stereotypes can influence individ-
ual performance on intellectual tasks. For example, Steele 
and Aronson (e.g., 1995) have repeatedly demonstrated 
that the mere salience of a stereotype is sufficient to 
impair stereotype-related performance. Some years later, 
Wheeler, Jarvis, and Petty (2001) showed this effect to 
operate not only with self-stereotyping but also with ste-
reotyping of others. One such mechanism has recently 
been examined in a functional MRI study in which par-
ticipants had to perform a memory task (n − 2 back task 
for letters) after having been primed with either the word 
“clever” or “stupid” (Bengtsson, Dolan, & Passingham, 
2011). Findings showed that participants who had been 
primed with “clever” spent more time making a response 
following an error. At the same time, this resulted in 
increased activation in the anterior paracingulate cortex 
on error trials. This finding is consistent with a role of the 
anterior paracingulate that is considered to be involved 
in monitoring task performance.
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Notes
1. It must be acknowledged that such manipulation checks 
are missing not only in replications but also in the original 
experiments.
2. This was one of the major arguments that Gergen (1973) 
used to argue “that social psychology is primarily an historical 
inquiry. Unlike the natural sciences, it deals with facts that are 
largely nonrepeatable and which fluctuate markedly over time” 
(p. 310).
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